The author has for a long time asserted that the Vinaya Piṭaka is different to the Sutra Piṭaka in that it is a legal document based on a conception of the law that is unique to Buddhism. Modern law is made up public law, consisting of administrative law, criminal law and criminal and civil litigation law, and private law, which is civil law. Public law is concerned with the machinery of state and administrative organs. Criminal law is classified as part of public law because when criminal offences occur, the law must act based on the idea that the police and other administrative organs have priority over the individual, even if no complaint or accusation has been made. Civil and criminal litigation law is classified as public law because proceedings and decisions have to be taken in a court of law or some other organ of the state. There is no need to explain why administrative law is considered part of public law. Civil law is classified as private law because it concerns things like ownership of wealth, its conveyance and inheritance, things that should in principle be managed by private individuals, as well as the determination of laws concerning them.

If we consider the Vinaya Piṭaka as a law book, what part would be equivalent to criminal law, civil law and litigation law? The administrative organ of Buddhism is the Saṃgha, and so regulations concerning it would be public law and it would have precedence over the private individual, while private law would be the regulations about items that bhikkhus and bhikkhunis should deal with on an individual basis. Specifically, the Khandakas section of the Pali Vinaya that deals with the various regulations concerning the management of the Saṃgha that make up the Mahāvagga and the Cullavagga (such as Admission to the Saṃgha, Uposatha, Rainy-season Residence, the Pavāraṇā Ceremony, dispute among the bhikkhus of Campa, dispute among the bhikkhus of Kosambi, living apart [for certain offences], further offences by a bhikkhu on probation, schism, suspension of the Pātimokkha, etc.) corresponds to administrative law. Offences such as the pārājika and the saṃghādisesa contained in the Sutta-vibhanga involved the Saṃgha, and grave offences, those that had to be denounced to the Saṃgha if the person who had committed them tried to hide them, correspond to criminal law. Regulations concerning the procedures for accusations and hearings, contained in the first and fourth chapters of the Cullavagga correspond to civil and criminal litigation law. Chapters in the Mahāvagga and Cullavagga about hides, medicines, clothing, minor matters and lodgings, which are regulations concerning matters like that as a rule a bhikkhu simply had to confess to a senior, minor offences entailing confession with forfeiture, and possessions of the individual or the Saṃgha, correspond to civil law. Private law includes commercial law, but since ordained people were forbidden to carry out economic or productive activities, there is nothing in the Vinaya Piṭaka analogous to it.

In this article, I have centred my study on the first and fourth chapters of the Cullavagga, that pertain to procedures to be followed when dealing with bhikkhus' offences and to explaining the rules for settling disputes. These correspond with criminal and civil litigation law. As I have pursued the topic of legal structure and legal ideas unique to the Vinaya, I have looked at how the offences and disputes classified as the four types of issue (dispute-issues, accusation-issues, offense-issues, duty-issues) were settled, and how the seven rules for settling disputes ("in the presence of the Vinaya," "mindfulness," "no longer insanity," "in accordance with confession," "with a majority decision," "with a punishment" and "covering over as with grass") actually worked. The rule about a majority decision will be dealt with in detail in Article 21.